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We study the market impact of a meta-order in the framework of the Minority Game. This
amounts to studying the response of the market when introducing a trader who buys or sells
a fixed amount h for a finite time T . This perturbation introduces statistical arbitrages that
traders exploit by adapting their trading strategies. The market impact depends on the na-
ture of the stationary state: we find that the permanent impact is zero in the unpredictable
(information efficient) phase, while in the predictable phase it is non-zero and grows linearly
with the size of the meta-order. This establishes a quantitative link between information effi-
ciency and trading efficiency (i.e. market impact). By using statistical mechanics methods for
disordered systems, we are able to fully characterize the response in the predictable phase, to
relate execution cost to response functions and obtain exact results for the permanent impact.
Keywords: Minority Game; Market Impact; Meta-order; Market Microstructure.
1. Introduction
Market impact is the effect on the price caused by an order, and it measures the tendency
of prices to move up (down) subsequent to a buy (sell) trade of a given size (Bouchaud
2010). Understanding market impact is a fundamental problem in financial markets, and
it has recently been the subject of several studies, both empirical (Hasbrouck and Seppi
2010, Plerou et al. 2002, Lyons and Evans 2002, Lillo et al. 2003, Almgren et al. 2005,
Moro et al. 2009, To´th, Eisler et al. 2011) and theoretical (Torre 1997, Grinold and Kahn 2000,
Farmer et al. 2005, Gabaix et al. 2005, Bouchaud et al. 2008, To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. 2011).
From a theoretical perspective, market impact is related to the problem of understand-
ing how information is incorporated into security prices (Bouchaud et al. 2008, Kyle 1985,
Glosten and Milfrom 1985, Hasbrouck 1991).
For practitioners, controlling market impact is essential in order to limit execution costs, which
arise because each trade impacts adversely on the price. In addition, traders often face the
problem of executing orders whose volume is much larger than the outstanding liquidity which
is available for trading at each moment in time, which is typically a factor 10−3 smaller than the
volumes exchanged daily (Bouchaud et al. 2008). A common strategy consists in splitting large
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orders in a sequence of child orders that are executed incrementally. This sequence of trades is
commonly called meta-order. The trading activity generated by meta-orders has been argued
to be one of the origins of long range auto-correlation in the flow of orders in financial markets
(Bouchaud et al. 2008), and generates market impact which extends beyond that of single orders.
One robust empirical finding is the fact that market impact is a concave function of the order
size both for individual orders (Bouchaud et al. 2008) and for meta-orders (Moro et al. 2009,
To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. 2011), in contrast with early models (e.g. Kyle 1985) which predict a
linear impact.
Understanding market impact requires addressing the strategic interaction between liquidity
providers and liquidity takers, and in particular modeling how the former exploit the predictable
trading patterns of the latter. Kyle’s seminal paper (Kyle 1985) and its most recent extension to
meta-orders (Farmer et al. 2011) build on this key ingredient, but are limited to simple (repre-
sentative) agent settings. In addition, the assumption of perfectly informed agents hardly suits
to realistic settings1. More recent theoretical studies on market impact have been done within
the framework of order-book models (Slanina 2008), which provide an accurate description of
the market microstructure. We take a complementary approach by using a coarse-grained de-
scription of the market, focusing on the collective behavior of a set of heterogeneous adaptive
market participants.
The natural framework for addressing this issue is the Minority Game (MG)
(Challet and Zhang 1997, Challet et al. 2005, Coolen 2005), which is a paradigmatic model of
heterogeneous adaptive agents who repeatedly interact in a market setting using simple “trading
strategies” to either buy or sell an asset, with the objective of being in the minority side (i.e. sell-
ing when the majority buys or vice-versa). In spite of its simplicity, the MG offers a picture of a
financial market as a many-agent interacting system where speculators “predate” on predictable
patterns introduced by other agents, much as in real financial markets. As such, the MG shows,
in a simplified setting, how markets aggregate information as a result of speculative activity. In
brief, one can distinguish an “asymmetric” phase, characterized by the presence of statistical
arbitrages when speculative pressure is low, from a “symmetric” phase, when there are many
speculators and the market is unpredicable (Challet and Marsili 1999). Close to the transition
between the two regimes several stylized facts observed in financial markets can be successfully
described by slightly generalizing the original MG problem (Challet et al. 2001, Bouchaud et al.
2001, Challet and Marsili 2003).
The MG is the appropriate setting for studying the market impact of meta-orders, because
it reproduces the response of adaptive traders to perturbations introduced by the persistent
activity of meta-orders. A meta-order is introduced in the MG by adding an extra agent that
consistently buys (or sells) for a finite time period, after which the extra agent is removed, and
the meta-order finishes. In order to analyze how this perturbation affects the price, one needs
to make an assumption on how the price is related to excess demand. Here we assume a market
clearing mechanism (Marsili 2001) taking a linear relation between them. Alternative approaches
are discussed in Sec. 4. This allows us to estimate the impact of the meta-order on price, during
and after its execution. Our main findings are: i) in the predictable phase the permanent impact
is nonzero, while in the unpredictable phase there is no permanent impact; ii) the permanent
impact can be computed analytically, relating it to response functions. Finally, iii) we find that
the market impact is linear with the size of the order, as a consequence of the assumed linear
relation between price and excess demand.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we define the model, discuss
its phase transition and explain how the meta-order is introduced. In Sec. 3 we present our
1Typically, liquidity takers are perfectly informed on how much they need to trade, but not on the future price of assets.
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results and in Sec. 4 we draw the main conclusions. Furthermore, we add appendices with the
calculations used to obtain the analytical results.
2. Grand-canonical Minority Game
2.1. Model definition
The MG describes a set of agents interacting in a market over a sequence of periods labeled
by a discrete time variable t ∈ N. Each period corresponds to the trading activity in a time
window [t, t + ∆t). A realistic value for ∆t must be much larger than inter-trade times, e.g.
∆t ≫ 10 s, and can be thought as being the typical time over which meaningful information
accumulates, e.g. few minutes1. Speculators act in the market by using trading strategies that
process the value of a public information signal µ and submit orders accordingly. In practice,
a number of trading strategies is constantly being evaluated and the most profitable are used.
Profitable strategies are those that dictate to buy when the majority is selling or vice-versa, i.e.
that place the trader in the minority side as frequently as possible. This captures in a simple
manner the market making activity of liquidity providers.
Formally, we consider the grand-canonical MG setup (Challet et al. 2005). The information
to which traders react can take P values, labeled by µ = 1, . . . , P . Every time step a new
signal µ(t) is drawn at random. We suppose there are two types of traders: liquidity takers –
also called producers in Challet et al. (2005) – and speculators or liquidity providers. There are
Np producers and Ns speculators and their only difference is that while the former react to
information signals in a deterministic manner, the latter are adaptive.
Specifically, each agent i is endowed with a trading strategy {aµi }Pµ=1, that dictates whether
to buy (aµi = +1) or to sell (a
µ
i = −1) when public information is µ(t) = µ. These strategies
are independently drawn for each player, uniformly in the set of all 2P possible binary functions
f : {1, . . . , P} → {±1}. However, while producers always trade according to their strategy,
speculators may choose to trade or not, adapting their behavior to the profitability of their
strategy. This choice is encoded in a dynamical variable φi(t), which takes the value φi(t) = 1 if
agent i decides to trade, and φi(t) = 0 otherwise. The profitability of a strategy is quantified by
a score Ui(t) that is updated according to
Ui(t+ 1) = Ui(t)− aµ(t)i A(t) , (1)
where the excess demand A(t) is given by
A(t) = Aµ(t)p +
Ns∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i φi(t) (2)
and Aµp is the sum of the contributions from producers when µ(t) = µ. The decision of playing
or not is taken in accordance to the score of the speculator. In the simplest case, agent i does not
trade if Ui(t) < 0 whereas she trades if the score is positive
2. In summary, a time-step iteration
1One method to estimate time-scales over which information flows is that of studying the dynamics of cross-correlations
between different stock prices. On very liquid stocks, Mastromatteo et al. (2011) show that for ∆t ≤ 1 min price dynamics is
dominated by noise, whereas Borghesi et al. (2007) show that the structure of correlations of daily returns can be recovered
already from the analysis of returns over ∆t = 5 minutes. Similar results have been discussed in To´th et al. (2006).
2This rule can be generalized using a stochastic choice model (Challet et al. 2005), without changing the main results
presented in this paper.
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of the model is realized in the following way:
- randomly generate a information variable µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , P};
- for each speculator i, set φi(t) = 1 if Ui(t) ≥ 0, and φi(t) = 0 otherwise;
- calculate A(t) using Eq. (2);
- for each speculator i, update Ui(t+ 1) by Eq. (1);
- set t→ t+ 1.
2.2. Phase transition in MG
As discussed in Challet and Marsili (2003) this model has a very rich phenomenology. In the
limit of large markets, analog to the thermodynamic limit in physics, the non-trivial regime
arises when P,Ns, Np → ∞, while ns = Ns/P and np = Np/P remain finite. A central role in
the characterization of the collective behavior is played by the quantity
H =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 , (3)
where
〈A|µ〉 = Aµp +
Ns∑
i=1
aµi 〈φi〉 (4)
denotes the average of A(t) conditional on µ(t) = µ. H detects the presence of statistical arbi-
trages, in that if H > 0 there is at least one value of µ which allows for a statistical prediction
of the excess demand when µ(t) = µ. For this reason H is called predictability. A remark-
able feature of the MG is that the dynamics converges to states of minimal predictability H
(Challet et al. 2005). This is not only appealing conceptually, as it says that speculators leave
the market as unpredictable as possible given their strategies, but it also opens the possibility
for analytic approaches to the MG. Indeed, it turns the study of the stationary state of the
MG into the analysis of the minima of H, as a function of the variables 〈φi〉. This is akin to
studying the ground state properties of a disordered system in physics, a problem for which a
plethora of powerful tools has been developed in recent years (Challet et al. 2005, Coolen 2005).
In Appendix A we show how this is done by calculating the critical line and the predictability
in the asymmetric phase. In brief, one finds that
H
Ns
=
np +Gns
(1 + χ)2
, (5)
where G is given in Eq. (A9) in the Appendix A and
χ =
1
Ns
Ns∑
i=1
δ〈φi〉
δai
(6)
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can be interpreted as an agent susceptibility, as it measures the response of agents’ behavior
to a change aµi → aµi + δai in their strategies1. The relation between χ and G on ns and np is
discussed in the appendix, here we focus on the resulting picture of the behavior of the MG,
which can be summarized as follows. For a fixed value of np, if ns is small enough the market
is predictable (H > 0) and the susceptibility χ is finite. In words, the number of speculators is
not enough to exploit the amount of statistical arbitrages introduced by producers. When ns
increases, H decreases whereas χ increases, in agreement with Eq. (5). Beyond a critical value
n∗s the susceptibility diverges (χ = ∞) and the market is unpredictable (H = 0). The point n∗s
marks a phase transition in that it separates two regions with distinctly different features. In
this paper we focus on the case np = 1, for which the critical value is n
∗
s ≈ 4.15.
2.3. Meta-orders in the Minority Game
In order to introduce a meta-order in the grand-canonical MG we add a fixed buyer to the system.
That is, we add one extra producer that always buys independently of the public information
pattern. This extra producer buys a quantity h of assets at each time, for T time steps. This
models a meta-order of duration T , and total size hT . Since typical relaxation times in the
MG are proportional to P , we’ll consider T proportional to P in what follows, which might
correspond to time-scales of one trading day. Note that turning on the meta-order corresponds
to changing the excess demand to
Ah(t) = hθ(T − t)θ(t) +Aµ(t)p +
Ns∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
i φi(t) , (7)
where θ(x) = 1 for x > 0 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise. This way of modeling the unwinding of a meta-
order is reminiscent of a very common scheduling strategy (the TWAP scheme), in which the
trader’s target is to execute a quantity of shares which grows linearly in time (Berkowitz et al.
1988).
It can be shown that, imposing a market clearing condition (see Marsili 2001,
De Martino and Marsili et al. 2006), the quantity A(t) is proportional to the return of the log-
arithm of the price, which is given by
log p(t+ 1) = log p(t) +
1
P
A(t) . (8)
Different market mechanisms can imply a different relation between price change p(t + 1)/p(t)
and excess demand A(t). This relation has implications in how the market impact depends on
the order size, which is of central importance in market impact studies. Our definition is likely
to be appropriate at large time scales (say, between one day and a week), in which one expects
stochasticity not to play a dominant role in the description of the market clearing mechanism.
We shall return to this point in the conclusions. We define the price impact as the averaged
log-price change in presence of the meta-order, minus the trend component which would have
1This is a standard result (Me´zard et al. 1987), see e.g. Appendix A1.1 in Marsili (2009) for an explicit derivation in
an interacting agents’ context. In the dynamic theory of MG (Coolen 2005), χ emerges as the integrated response of an
instantaneous perturbation. Loosely speaking, it measures the time over which agents’s behavior maintains memory of
perturbations.
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been present in the unperturbed case. This corresponds to the quantity
∆(t) =
1
P
∑
0≤s<t
〈
Ah(s)−Ah=0(s)
〉
, (9)
where s = 0 corresponds to the beginning of the meta-order, the average over the stationary state
distribution is denoted with 〈· · · 〉 and the one over the possible choices of the fixed strategies1
aµi has been written as (· · · ). This averaging procedure mimics the averages in empirical studies,
which are on different orders at different times, as well as on different markets (Moro et al. 2009,
To´th, Eisler et al. 2011, To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. 2011). Notice that 〈Ah=0〉 is expected to be zero
only after averaging over the fixed strategies, as in the asymmetric phase its value is finite, and
fluctuates from realization to realization.2 The averages in Eq. (9) are numerically estimated
according to the following procedure. Initially all the scores are set to zero and the model is run
until it relaxes to the stationary state. In this initial phase of the evolution speculators adapt
to the information injected by producers in the absence of a meta-order. Then we compute
〈Ah=0〉 taking a time average in the stationary state3. After that the meta-order is turned on
and we start measuring the impact. Finally the average over the fixed strategies is computed by
repeating this procedure for a large number of realizations.
We will also consider ∆(t) for t > T , since we are interested in the response of the system
after the meta-order is turned-off. Of particular interest is the permanent impact, which reads
∆∗ = limt→∞∆(t), and the average execution cost
p(0)∆¯ = p(0)
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
∆(t)
]
(10)
which measures the mean price increment incurred during the meta-order. In particular, it is a
simple exercise to show that the cost of an execution for a trader is related to the maximum
price increment p(0)∆(T ) as
∆¯
∆(T )
=
〈
1
T
∑
t p(t)− p(0)
〉
〈p(T )− p(0)〉 . (11)
The estimation of the above quantity provides a practical mean to evaluate the concavity of price
impact: for a market impact of the form ∆(t) ∝ tα, one finds that ∆¯/∆(T ) = 1/(1 + α), which
indicates that concave impact functions have to be associated with a value of ∆¯/∆(T ) > 1/2,
while for convex impact functions a value smaller than 1/2 has to be expected.
3. Results
Let us first analyze how the impact changes depending on whether the model is in the symmetric
or the asymmetric phase. In Fig. 1 we plot the impact ∆(t), obtained from numerical simulations,
1The strategies are fixed in the sense that they do not change during the whole evolution of the system, i.e. before the
beginning of the order, during the order and after its completion. In physical jargon such variables would be called quenched
strategies. However, for the sake of clarity, we will continue to refer to them as fixed strategies.
2It can be estimated (Challet et al. 2005) that 〈Ah=0〉 is finite for any realization of the MG, and it is described by a
Gaussian random variable of mean zero and variance H/Ns.
3The average has to be taken on times much longer than those over which we observe the impact ∆(t).
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Figure 1. Comparison between the MG in the asymmetric and symmetric phases for P = 400, T = 5P ,
and 5 × 103 realizations. On the left side we have ns = 1 where the predictability and the permanent
impact are non-zero. On the right side ns = 5, where H = 0.
as a function of time for ns = 1 (predictable phase) and ns = 5 (unpredictable phase). In
the predictable phase the impact grows linearly during the meta-order. After the meta-order
finishes, it decays to a constant faster than a power law, but with a long relaxation time. In the
unpredictable phase the situation is rather different. During the meta-order the impact grows
initially very fast and then it reaches a saturation value. After the meta-order is finished the
impact quickly relaxes back to zero. Therefore, as a main result of this paper, we find that if the
market is unpredictable (H = 0) the permanent impact is zero and if the market is predictable
(H > 0) the permanent impact is non-zero. We point out that the permanent impact is zero in
the symmetric phase as long as the the duration of the meta-order T is big enough such that
the impact saturates before the end of the meta-order. If T is much smaller than the time for
saturation to set in, the permanent impact in the symmetric phase is non-zero.
In terms of the excess demand we have the following picture: immediately after the order is
turned on, the (average) excess demand jumps from 0 to h. During the execution of the meta-
order it relaxes to a value smaller than h. In the unpredictable phase, this value is zero, whereas
in the predictable phase it is finite, implying a linear growth of the impact. At the end of the
meta-order (t = T ) the excess demand suddenly drops by h, thus becoming negative. Finally it
relaxes back to zero, regardless of the phase.
This result can be explained in the following way. If predictability is zero, it means that the
market is information free and the system is able to absorb the extra information of the extra
fixed buyer. Therefore, the value of the excess demand relaxes back to zero during the meta-
order. On the other hand, when the market is predictable the number of speculators is not
enough to consume all the information available. Hence, when the perturbation is added, the
system reaches a new stationary state where the value of the excess demand is non-zero.
Fig. 2 shows that the impact grows linearly with the order size Q = hT . Indeed the rescaled
impact ∆/h collapses on the same curve, when plotted against t/T . This is a consequence of the
assumed market mechanism and of linear response theory, as we shall see, and it contrasts with
results of empirical (e.g. To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. 2011) which find a square root law ∆ ∼ √Q.
We will come back to this issue in the concluding section.
These results are fully consistent with the theoretical predictions. As we show in Appendix
B, the stationary state of the system in the presence of the meta-order can be calculated by
minimizing the predictability H with the modified excess demand (7). This allows us to calculate
October 8, 2018 12:40 Quantitative Finance paper
8
10-1 100 101 102
t/T
0
1
2
3
4
5
∆/h
h=1
h=2
h=3
h=4
h=5
Figure 2. Market impact as a function of time for different values of h, for ns = 1, P = 400, T = 5P ,
and 5× 103 realizations. The collapse of the curves shows that the market impact grows linearly with h.
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Figure 3. Comparison between the saturation value of the aggregate in the presence of the meta-order
〈Ah〉 obtained analytically (full line) and from numerical simulations (open circles). The error on the
points from numerical simulations is at most of the size of the open circles.
the saturation value of the excess demand before the meta-order is finished, which is given by
〈Ah〉 = 〈Ah=0〉+ h
1 + χ
, (12)
In order to obtain it numerically we calculate the slope of the curves of ∆(t) when the linear
growth of the impact sets in, after some initial transient. In Fig. 3 we can see that the numerical
results are in full agreement with the exact calculation.
It is worth noticing that 〈Ah〉/h, which measures the response of the market to a perturbation
A → A + h, is inversely proportional to the susceptibility χ of agents’ behavior. The market
impact is larger when agents are not very susceptible to perturbations, whereas it is minimal in
the symmetric phase (H = 0), when agents respond strongly to any perturbation.
In order to address the dynamic effects of market impact, it is necessary to reformulate the
dynamics in a continuum time description which acknowledges the fact that characteristic times
October 8, 2018 12:40 Quantitative Finance paper
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Figure 4. Comparison of numerical simulations with the permanent impact given by formula (15). The
numerical results were obtained with P = 400, T = 5P , and 5×103 independent realizations. The straight
horizontal lines indicate the value of the permanent impact obtained from (15).
in the MG are of order P (Challet et al. 2005, Coolen 2005). As long as the perturbation h is
much smaller than A ∼ √P , linear response theory holds, i.e.,
〈Ah(t)〉 = 〈Ah=0(t)〉+ 1
1 + χ
∫ t/P
−∞
dτ K(t/P − τ)h˜(τ) , (13)
where h˜(τ) = h(Pτ) = hθ(T/P − τ)θ(τ) is the perturbation and K(τ) is a kernel that contains
the relaxation dynamics. Note that if t, T →∞ we expect to recover the stationary value of Eq.
(12), hence
∫∞
−∞ dτK(τ) = 1. Also causality requires K(τ) = 0 for τ < 0. We remark that in
order to reproduce the small time behavior of the model (i.e. 〈Ah(t)−Ah=0(t)〉 ≈ h for small t),
the function K(τ) must have the form
K(τ) = (1 + χ)δ(τ) − χKr(τ) , (14)
where Kr(τ) is non-singular in zero, causal (Kr(τ) = 0 for τ < 0) and
∫∞
−∞ dτKr(τ) = 1. Kr(t)
in Eq. (14) captures how adaptive traders detect the statistical arbitrage introduced by the
meta-order and react to it, by removing it as a result of their activity. If in addition we assume
that Kr(τ) decays fast enough when τ → ∞, then within linear response theory, we show in
Appendix C that the permanent impact is
∆∗(h, T ) =
hT
P (1 + χ)
. (15)
The assumption on K(s) is fully consistent with simulations, where the excess demand is found
to relax faster than a power-law, which is expected since we are not considering the model
at criticality. In Fig. 4 we see agreement between Eq. (15) and numerical results. However,
relaxation times are rather long even for values of ns considerably far from the critical value
n∗s ≈ 4.15, making the error bars become very large before ∆ is saturated.
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Finally, the average execution cost, which is derived in Appendix D, is given by
∆¯
∆(T )
= 1− 1
2
(
κ0T − κ2T
κ0T − κ1T
)
, κmT =
∫ 1
0
dxxmK(xT/P ) . (16)
For a kernel K(τ) of the form (14) and execution times T/P much smaller than the characteristic
relaxation time of Kr(τ), this quantity is well approximated by
∆¯
∆(T )
≈ 1
2
+
T
12P
(
χ
1 + χ
)
Kr(0) , (17)
while at large times we obtain a value ∆¯/∆(T ) = 1/2 which signals a linear impact. This should
be compared with ∆¯/∆(T ) ≈ 0.6 ÷ 0.7 reported in empirical studies (e.g. Farmer et al. 2011,
To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. 2011), and with the arguments in To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. (2011).
4. Conclusion
The market impact has been the subject of intense discussion recently. Proposals of universal
laws have been put forward (Farmer et al. 2011, To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. 2011) on the basis of
empirical analysis and simple models. Here we address this issue within the framework of the
Minority Game. At odds with zero-intelligence (or ǫ-intelligence (To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. 2011))
models, the MG retains a level of rationality of the agents without making strong assumptions on
their information on future returns (as in Farmer et al. 2011). Rather, traders learn adaptively
on the profitability of their strategies. In addition, the minority rule is rather appropriate if one
focuses on market making activity, where the profit of agents comes from matching imbalances
in demand. Finally, the MG is the ideal platform to address how markets digest information on
order imbalances from meta-orders and to address the issue of the market impact beyond its
immediate consequences.
We have shown that the MG provides realistic curves for the market impacts and sheds light
on the mechanisms which are responsible for it. Most interesting, we derive a relation between
market impact and information efficiency, whereby the permanent impact of a meta-order is
smaller the more the market is free of statistical arbitrages. For a perfectly “symmetric” market
where returns are statistically unpredictable, prices should revert to the values before the order
started, and hence the permanent impact should be zero. Understanding whether this relation
extends to other modeling frameworks or whether it is confirmed by empirical data, is a very
interesting issue for future research.
A noticeable shortcoming of our analysis pertains the prediction of a linear impact with order
size (Q = Th in our notations), which contradicts the observed concave behavior ∆ ∼ Qγ , with
γ ∈ [0.5, 0.8]. It is easy to identify the origin of this behavior within the MG, in the assumed
market mechanism. This assumes a matching of orders at a single deterministic price, fixed by
market clearing. Indeed, the price itself does not enter into the definition of the MG. Strictly
speaking the MG describes the dynamics of the excess demand, and how this is determined by
market makers who adaptively respond to it, in their effort to match it dynamically. Therefore,
on one side this suggest to look for alternative definitions of the price in the MG, capturing
more faithfully the dynamics of the order book. On the other, this suggest to look at empirical
measures of the market impact in terms of the demand imbalance itself.
The analysis of the more realistic case in which the size of the orders hT is Pareto distributed
would also be a relevant extension of the present work, and could allow the model to describe
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persistence of the order flow (see Farmer et al. (2011) and To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. (2011)). There
are two possible choices: either h can be Pareto distributed and T fixed, or, vice versa, T is Pareto
distributed and h fixed. In the former case it would not be possible to apply linear response
theory, since there will be realizations with h ≃ P , which is not a small perturbation. In the
latter case it must be considered that when one measures the market impact averaged over orders
of different volumes for a given value of volume Q, only the orders whose volume is larger than
or equal to Q are taken into account. If the difference in volume depends only on the difference
in the length of the order then, at a given time, only the orders which are still standing are
taken into the average. As a consequence, it is easy to show that, at least during the execution
of the meta-order, the market impact is still linear with respect to the volume. Alternatively, it
would be very interesting to study a Pareto distributed order flow for the environment (i.e. by
assigning to the producers strategies which lead to large fluctuations of the excess demand Aµp ).
In this case the market stationary properties should be different, and an anomalous response to
a meta-order could emerge. It is not easy to anticipate what the behavior of the system would
be as the problem becomes harder to solve analytically.
Finally, as discussed in To´th, Lempe´rie`re et al. (2011), the market impact is expected to cross-
over to a linear behavior for times longer than few days. This supports the view that the MG
provides a description of market activity on intermediate time-scales, with P representing a
time-scale between one day and a week.
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Appendix A: The stationary state of the grand-canonical Minority Game
with replica symmetric approach
The problem of calculating the macroscopic observables of the grand-canonical MG in the sta-
tionary state can be solved by finding the minimum (also referred as ground state) of a Hamil-
tonian function, which is precisely the Lyapunov function minimized by the dynamics of the
grand-canonical MG (De Martino and Marsili et al. 2006)
H0(m) =
1
2Ns
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 , (A1)
where
〈A|µ〉 =
√
Npxµ +
Ns∑
i=1
aµimi (A2)
and m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mNs). Each of the mi ∈ [0, 1] is the average value of φi in the stationary
state, and xµ is a Gaussian variable with zero mean and unit variance. For convenience we are
considering an Hamiltonian that is different from the predictability H = 2nsH0. Therefore, in
order to recover the free energy associated with H, one has simply to multiply the free energy
obtained with H0 by 2ns.
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Let us define the partition function
Z = Trm exp(−βH0) = Trm
〈
exp

 P∑
µ=1
i
√
β
Ns
〈A|µ〉 zµ

〉
z
, (A3)
where we have used the Hubbard-Stratonovich trick in the second equality and
〈f(z)〉z =
1√
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−z2/2)f(z)dz . (A4)
The minimum of H0 averaged over the fixed strategies a
µ
i can be obtained from the partition
function in the limit of β →∞. It is given by
lim
Ns→∞
min
m
H0
Ns
= − lim
Ns→∞
lim
β→∞
lim
n→0
1
βNsn
lnZn , (A5)
where the over-bar denotes an average over the fixed strategies and the variable n was introduced
in order to calculate the average lnZ through the one of Zn, a strategy known as replica trick
(Me´zard et al. 1987). We now proceed calculating Zn.
It is a simple exercise (see De Martino and Marsili et al. 2006) to show that after averaging
out the fixed strategies we obtain
Zn = Tr{ma}
〈
exp

−β
2
∑
a,b
zµa z
µ
b
(
np
ns
+
1
Ns
∑
i
miamib
)〉
z
, (A6)
where the indices a, b run over the n replicas.
Introducing the overlap matrix Gab =
1
Ns
∑
imiamib and the response matrix G˜ab (see
De Martino and Marsili et al. 2006, for details), it follows that
Zn =
∫
dG dG˜ exp(−βnNsf(G, G˜)) , (A7)
where
f(G, G˜) =
1
2βnsn
Tr ln
[
I+ β
(
np
ns
+G
)]
+
β
2nsn
∑
a≤b
GabG˜ab
− 1
βn
ln Tr{ma} exp

 β2
2ns
∑
a≤b
G˜abmamb

 . (A8)
We now take the ansatz (known as the replica symmetric ansatz) Gab = g + (G − g)δab and
G˜ab = 2R− (R + ρ/β)δab. Note that in terms of the original variables
G =
1
Ns
Ns∑
i=1
〈φi〉2 . (A9)
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In this way the free energy f(G, G˜) becomes
f(G, g,R, ρ) =
1
2βns
ln (1 + β(G− g)) + 1
2ns
np/ns + g
1 + β(G− g) +
R
2ns
β(G − g)
− 1
β
〈
ln
∫ 1
0
dm exp(−βV (m, z))
〉
z
, (A10)
where V (m, z) = 12ns ρm
2 +
√
R
ns
zm. In the limit of N →∞ the free energy is dominated by its
minimum and the saddle-point equations are
G = F (ζ)
χ
1 + χ
=
ns
2
Erf(ζ/
√
2)
ρ =
1
1 + χ
R =
np/ns +G
(1 + χ)2
, (A11)
where χ = β(G−g), ζ = ρ/√Rns, and F (ζ) = − 1√2πζ exp(−ζ2/2)+
1
2ζ2Erf(ζ/
√
2)+ 12Erfc(ζ/
√
2).
Rearranging these equations we obtain the following recipe to calculate the macroscopic observ-
ables. First one should solve the following transcendental equation in order to obtain ζ as a
function of the control parameters ns and np,
nsF (ζ) =
1
ζ2
− np . (A12)
After that, one can express the macroscopic observables as function of ζ by using the saddle
point equations. For example, it is easy to calculate the minimum of the free energy to obtain
the predictability as
H = 2n2sfSP P = Ns (np + nsF (ζ))
(
1− ns
2
Erf(ζ/
√
2)
)2
, (A13)
where fSP is the free energy at the saddle point. Moreover the susceptibility χ is written as
χ =
nsErf(ζ/
√
2)
2− nsErf(ζ/
√
2)
. (A14)
Appendix B: Perturbing the Hamiltonian
We now consider the perturbed Hamiltonian
Hh(m) =
1
2Ns
P∑
µ=1
(〈A|µ〉+ h)2 . (B1)
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This corresponds to the Lyapunov function that is minimized by the dynamics when the meta-
order is turned-on. Therefore, it gives the stationary state measure for the case with an extra
buyer.
The calculations in the present case are analogous to the calculations in Appendix A. For
example, with the perturbation, Eq. (A6) changes to
Znh =
〈
exp
(
i
√
β
Ns
∑
a,µ
hzaµ
)
Tr{ma} exp

−β
2
∑
a,b
zµa z
µ
b
(
np
ns
+
1
Ns
∑
i
miamib
)〉
z
, (B2)
where the Zh indicates the partition function associated with Hh. This leads to the following
free energy
fh(G, G˜) =
h2P
2N2s n
∑
a,b
M−1ab + f(G, G˜) , (B3)
where Mab = δab + β(np/ns + Gab) and f(G, G˜) is the free energy given by (A10). With the
replica symmetric ansatz we have
∑
abM
−1
ab =
n
1+β(G−g) +O(n
2), leading to
fh(G, g,R, ρ) =
h2P
2N2s (1 + χ)
+ f(G, g,R, ρ) . (B4)
Hence, we have obtained the free energy for the perturbed case. Moreover, if we write
Zh = Trm exp
(
− β
2Ns
∑
µ
(〈A|µ〉+ h)2
)
, (B5)
we get
lim
Ns→∞
lim
β→∞
(
−Ns
βP
)(
d lnZh
dh
)
=
〈
1
P
∑
µ
(〈A|µ〉+ h)
〉
= 〈Ah〉 . (B6)
This gives
〈Ah〉 = N
2
s
P
d
dh
fh . (B7)
Finally, from Eq. (B4) we obtain Eq. (12), where χ is given by Eq. (A14), after numerically
solving Eq. (A12).
Appendix C: Permanent impact
In the following we show how the permanent impact relates to the stationary state quantities of
the model calculated above. We will consider the continuous time description of the dynamics
October 8, 2018 12:40 Quantitative Finance paper
15
(Challet et al. 2005) as justified in Sec. 3, and define accordingly the quantities T˜ = T/P and
∆˜(τ) = ∆(τP ) ≈
∫ τ
0
dτ ′
〈
Ah(τ ′P )
〉
−
〈
Ah=0(τ ′P )
〉
. (C1)
Within linear response theory, Eq. (13) yield the response at time t of the system due to a
perturbation h˜(τ), in terms of the kernel K(τ). Note that
∫∞
−∞ dτK(τ) = 1 and that causality
requires K(τ) = 0 for τ < 0. From Eq. (9) the permanent impact ∆∗ = limτ→∞ ∆˜(τ) is given
by
∆∗ =
1
1 + χ
∫ ∞
0
dτ
∫ τ
−∞
dτ ′ K(τ − τ ′) h˜(τ ′) . (C2)
Assuming that K(τ) is an integrable function, we have
K(τ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
dω
2π
Kωe
−iωτ . (C3)
Therefore, the expression for the permanent impact can be written as
∆∗ =
h
(1 + χ)
∫ ∞
0
dτ
∫ T˜
0
dτ ′
∫ +∞
−∞
dω
2π
Kωe
−iω(τ−τ ′)
=
h
(1 + χ)
lim
ǫ→0+
∫ +∞
−∞
dω
2π
(
1
iω + ǫ
)(
1− e(iω+ǫ)T˜
−iω − ǫ
)
Kω . (C4)
The value of this integral is determined by the value of the residues of the integrand on the
plane ℑω > 0, provided that |Kω/ω| → 0 for |ω| → ∞. If Kω has no poles on such domain,
which corresponds to the assumption of causality K(τ) = 0 for τ < 0, the only contribution to
the integral comes from a second-order pole in ω = iǫ. Hence, using
∫ +∞
−∞ dτK(τ) = 1 we obtain
our final formula
∆∗ = i
h
1 + χ
lim
ǫ→0+
(
−iKiǫT˜
)
=
hT
P (1 + χ)
. (C5)
Appendix D: Average execution cost
We calculate in the following the expression for the average execution cost as defined in Eq. (11),
and compare it with the maximum price increment ∆(T )p(0). To calculate those quantities it
is sufficient to assume linear response by plugging Eq. (13) into the definitions of ∆(T ) and ∆¯.
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The former quantity can be obtained straightforwardly integrating by parts, and results
∆(T ) ≈ h
1 + χ
∫ T˜
0
dτ
∫ τ
0
dτ ′K(τ − τ ′)
=
h
1 + χ
[∫ T˜
0
dτ (T˜ − τ)K(τ)
]
=
hT˜ 2
1 + χ
[
κ0T − κ1T
]
, (D1)
where the averages κmT have been defined in Eq. (16). The expression of the average execution
cost is analogously derived by using integration by parts
∆¯ =
1
T
∑
1≤t<T
∆(t) ≈ 1
T˜
∫ T˜
0
dτ ∆˜(τ)
=
hT˜ 2
2(1 + χ)
[
κ0T − 2κ1T + κ2T
]
. (D2)
By taking the ratio of those expressions one obtains Eq. (16). The functions κmT can formally
be computed by inserting the expression (14) into their definition. In particular we obtain the
series expansion
κmT = δm=0 (1 + χ) T˜
−1 − χ
∞∑
n=0
K
(n)
r (0)
n!
T˜ n
n+m+ 1
, (D3)
where K
(n)
r (0) is the n-th derivative of the function Kr(τ) evaluated in zero. Such expansion
allows to calculate Eq. (17) which is obtained in the limit of small T˜ .1 The execution cost in the
limit of T˜ much larger than the characteristic relaxation time τr can be estimated by noting the
scaling
κmT ∼
1
τr
(
τr
T˜
)m+1
, (D4)
so that just the κ0T terms contributes to Eq. (16). This implies that in this limit ∆¯/∆(T ) tends
to the value of 1/2.
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